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ISSUE #4 · {{current_date_full}}

Tariffing Russia's Oil Buyers  ·  Taiwan and the Pacific Forum  ·  Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Red Sea  ·  Reader FAQ

Welcome back to The Global Chessboard. This issue follows three fronts where economic pressure and hard power are being tested at once, an American push to tax the buyers of Russian oil, a diplomatic contest over Taiwan in the Pacific, and a hardening standoff over access to the Red Sea.

COVER STORY · ISSUE #4

Washington Moves to Tariff the Buyers of Russian Oil

Est. read time: 4 min · Economics · Sanctions

On August 7 the United States Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 by a vote of 86 to 11, and this week the House introduced its own companion bill and began moving it toward a floor vote. The legislation would authorize tariffs of up to 100 percent on countries that keep buying Russian oil and natural gas, a group that includes China, India, and Brazil, while extending sanctions on Iran's energy and weapons sectors at President Trump's request. The bill, renamed to honor Senator Graham after his death in July, is the most far reaching attempt yet to use trade penalties against third countries as a lever to pressure Moscow over the war in Ukraine.

A bipartisan majority argues the measure finally targets the revenue that sustains Russia's war, by making it costly for large economies to keep buying discounted Russian crude. Sponsors say the president would gain, in Graham's words, tremendous leverage to press China, India, and Brazil to reduce those purchases. Ukraine's government and many in Washington frame the bill as overdue, a way to convert economic weight into diplomatic pressure after ceasefire talks stalled, and they point to the lopsided Senate vote as evidence of rare cross party consensus.

The countries in the crosshairs see the secondary tariffs as coercion aimed at their sovereign trade decisions rather than at Russia itself. India, already facing steep United States tariffs tied to its Russian oil imports, has called such measures unfair, and Beijing has signaled it will not curb purchases under external pressure. Some analysts and lawmakers worry the bill hands the president broad discretionary authority, including waivers, that turns sanctions into a bargaining chip, while others warn that taxing major oil buyers could raise global energy prices and strain ties with partners Washington needs elsewhere.

Secondary sanctions are a blunt instrument with a mixed record. Their bite depends less on the statute than on whether an administration chooses to enforce it, and the waiver authority built into this bill leaves that choice firmly in the president's hands. History shows targeted economies often adapt, rerouting oil through intermediaries, shadow fleets, and alternative payment channels, which can dull the intended pressure while still unsettling markets. The deeper question is whether Washington will absorb the cost of penalizing large trading partners, because a threat that is never carried out yields leverage only until the other side decides to test it.

Sources: CNBC, The Hill, Al Jazeera, RFE/RL

SECURITY · INDO-PACIFIC

Taiwan's Return to the Pacific Islands Forum Reopens a Diplomatic Fight

Est. read time: 3 min · Indo-Pacific · Diplomacy

On August 11 China urged the Pacific Islands Forum to adhere to the one-China principle and to properly handle Taiwan-related issues, after the forum's leadership confirmed that Taiwan would attend this year's leaders' summit. Palau, one of Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners, is hosting the gathering from August 30 to September 4, and Taipei's participation reverses its exclusion from the 2025 meeting. The dispute has turned a regional development forum into the latest arena for the contest over Taiwan's international standing.

Taiwan and its supporters point out that Taipei has been a development partner of the forum since the 1990s, funding projects across the Pacific, and argue that barring it rewards Chinese pressure rather than reflecting the wishes of island states. Officials in Palau, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands, which maintain ties with Taipei, frame its attendance as a matter of practical cooperation on climate, fisheries, and development rather than a political statement, and they resist what they see as outside dictation of who may sit at their table.

Beijing maintains that Taiwan is a part of China and that no international body should offer Taipei a platform that implies statehood. Chinese officials describe their message to the forum as a defense of a principle most of the world's governments formally acknowledge, and they accuse the United States and its partners of using Pacific institutions to advance Taiwan's status. From Beijing's vantage the forum's handling of the issue is a test of whether small states will hold to commitments it considers settled.

The Pacific has become a theater of competition in which recognition itself is the currency, and the forum's own membership is split, with some states recognizing Beijing and others Taipei. That division makes consensus fragile and gives both capitals reason to press their case through aid, diplomacy, and high level visits. Analysts note that the argument over Taiwan's presence is less about a single summit than about precedent, because each decision shapes how far either side can advance its claim without triggering a wider rupture in a region both powers are courting.

Sources: Reuters via A News, Taipei Times, The Diplomat

SECURITY · HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia and Eritrea Edge Toward War Over Red Sea Access

Est. read time: 4 min · Horn of Africa · Security

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have sharpened this month, with reports of Eritrean forces and heavy weaponry moving into northern Ethiopia's Tigray region in early August and senior Eritrean commanders crossing the border in a public show of presence. The friction is rooted in landlocked Ethiopia's push to regain access to the Red Sea, including the Eritrean port of Assab, a demand Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has called a matter of survival. Both governments have moved troops toward their shared frontier, raising fears that a cold standoff could tip into open conflict in one of the world's most strategically sensitive corridors.

Addis Ababa argues that a nation of well over 100 million people cannot remain dependent on a single foreign port for nearly all of its trade, and that guaranteed sea access is an economic and security necessity rather than a territorial grab. Ethiopian officials say they prefer negotiation and have called for international mediation, while insisting the demand is irreversible. They accuse Eritrea of arming and sheltering groups hostile to the federal government, casting Ethiopian pressure as a response to threats along the border rather than the cause of them.

Asmara rejects any claim on its territory or ports as a violation of a sovereignty won through decades of war, and has denounced Ethiopian accusations of troop buildups as fabricated. Eritrean officials frame the rhetoric about Assab as expansionism that threatens the entire region, and they have found sympathy from Egypt, which is at odds with Ethiopia over the Nile dam and argues that only coastal states should control Red Sea access. From Asmara's position, mobilization is defensive, a necessary guard against a larger neighbor's ambitions.

The Horn of Africa sits astride shipping lanes that carry a large share of global trade toward the Suez Canal, so instability there draws in outside powers quickly. Analysts warn that even without a full invasion, the more likely danger is escalating proxy clashes, as each side backs armed factions along a porous border still scarred by the war that ended in 2018 and the Tigray conflict that followed. A renewed Ethiopia Eritrea war would unsettle a region already strained by the conflict in Sudan and by fragile politics in Somalia, which is why regional bodies and Gulf states are watching the mobilizations with unusual concern.

Sources: Bloomberg, BBC, International Crisis Group, World Politics Review

READER FAQ

Your Questions, Answered

Each issue we answer the most pressing questions from our readers. Submit yours by replying to this email.

Q: Why do secondary sanctions target countries that are not the main adversary?

A: Secondary sanctions and tariffs aim at third countries that trade with a sanctioned state, on the theory that cutting off the customers is more effective than penalizing the target alone. The logic is to raise the cost of doing business with the adversary until the economic relationship becomes unattractive. Their weakness is that they can strain relations with neutral or friendly states and push targeted trade into harder to track channels rather than ending it.

Q: Why is access to the sea such a persistent driver of conflict for landlocked states?

A: Landlocked countries depend on neighbors or distant ports for nearly all seaborne trade, which leaves them exposed to transit fees, political leverage, and the risk of closure during a dispute. For a large economy that dependence can feel like a permanent vulnerability, which is why some governments treat guaranteed sea access as a core national interest. The difficulty is that securing it usually means bargaining for, or claiming, territory or rights that a coastal neighbor considers sovereign.

Q: What does it mean for a diplomatic forum to follow the one-China principle?

A: The one-China principle is Beijing's position that there is a single Chinese state and that Taiwan is part of it, and China asks governments and organizations to acknowledge this as a condition of relations. In practice most countries maintain formal ties with Beijing while keeping unofficial links with Taipei. When China presses an international body to honor the principle, it is usually seeking to limit Taiwan's ability to take part in ways that could imply it is a separate state.

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